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A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede 
Game 
Abstract: In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting 
and terminating play.  The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implies that play terminates on 
the first move, even though continuing play can benefit both players—but not if the rival defects 
immediately, which it has an incentive to do.   We show that, without changing the structure of 
the game, interchanging the payoffs of the two players provides each with an incentive to 
cooperate whenever its turn comes up.  The unique Nash equilibrium in the transformed 
Centipede Game, called the Reciprocity Game, is unique—unlike the Centipede Game, where 
there are many Nash equilibria.  The Reciprocity Game can be implemented noncooperatively 
by adding, at the start of the Centipede Game, a move to exchange payoffs, which it is rational 
for the players to choose.  What this interchange signifies, and its application to transforming an 
arms race into an arms-control treaty, are discussed. 




Since Rosenthal (1981) introduced what has come to be called the Centipede Game, there has 
been controversy about what constitutes rational play in it.  We will describe an abbreviated form 
of this game and show that it bears some resemblance to Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD).   
Unlike IPD, however, the players do not make simultaneous choices, in ignorance of each 
other, in a stage game, which is then repeated.  Instead, they make sequential choices in a game 
of perfect information, in which the players’ strategic situation may change after every move.  
Like IPD, nevertheless, there is a tension in the Centipede Game between its Pareto-inferior 
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome and a Pareto-optimal nonequilibrium outcome.   
Interchanging the two players’ payoffs at each stage of the Centipede Game transforms it 
into a new game we call the Reciprocity Game.  The latter game makes it rational, via backward 
induction, for each player not to defect at any opportunity to do so but, instead, to cooperate until 
the end of play, whether or not the endpoint is known (the game is assumed to be finite).  
To implement the Reciprocity Game, we give the players at the outset of the Centipede 
Game the choice of playing this game or switching to the Reciprocity Game.  Because the payoff 
from continuing play to the end in the Reciprocity Game outweighs the benefit at each stage of 
defecting, the players will rationally choose to play the Reciprocity Game over the Centipede 
Game.  Since the roles of the players are reversed on each round of the Reciprocity Game, both 
players, when they make their choices, find it in their mutual interest to cooperate until the end, 
whether it is fixed or probabilistic.   
It is no surprise that, if a game changes, its equilibria may also change.  What is striking in 
going from the Centipede Game to the Reciprocity Game is that no feature of the Centipede 
Game changes except for the switch of payoffs between the players, which benefits not the player 
who defects on a round but its rival, who can then reciprocate on the next round.   
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Because the sum of the payoffs to the players on each round remains the same in the two 
games, it is the redistribution that transforms the Pareto-inferior subgame-perfect equilibrium in 
the Centipede Game into a more compelling Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium in the 
Reciprocity Game.1  We will return to this feature, and its implications for reciprocity, in section 
3, using an arms-control treaty as an example.  
2.  The Centipede Game 
In the Centipede Game, two players, P1 and P2, take turns choosing whether to take some 
payoff (defect), which terminates play, or not take it (cooperate), in which case the other player is 
given the same choice in the following round.  If neither player defects in a round, play continues 
for 100 rounds, reflecting the many pairs of legs of a centipede (not necessarily 100).  The amount 
that each player receives steadily accumulates if neither defects, until it is divided equally 
between the two players when play terminates after 100 rounds.  
In the Centipede Game we analyze next (there are different versions---see section 3), we limit 
play to two choices each for P1 and P2 over four rounds (see Figure 1 for the game in extensive 
form).  Starting at the top of the game tree, P1 chooses between defecting, d, and cooperating, c. If 
P1 defects, the game ends.  If P1 cooperates, play passes to P2, which has the same choice as P1 
did on the first round.  Play continues as long as neither player defects, until the fourth round, 
when play terminates whether or not P2 chooses d or c.   
















(2, 4) (3, 3) 
We show the payoffs to (P1, P2) at each terminal node, where either P1 or P2 defects (by 
moving to the left) or when both players cooperate throughout (on the bottom right).  These 
payoffs show that both players benefit equally at (3, 3) if they cooperate over the entire course of 
play.  If one player defects at any point, its payoff is greater than its rival’s payoff.  
Although a player who defects receives an immediate bonus from defecting, the 
accumulating payoffs of both players from cooperating to the end are at least as good as, and 
sometimes better than, those they would receive if either player had defected earlier.  More 
specifically, if both players cooperated through the fourth round, their payoffs of (3, 3) are equal 
to or greater than their payoffs of (1, 0), (0, 2), and (3, 1) if one player had defected earlier.   
To be sure, P2 would have done even better at (2, 4) than (3, 3) if it had defected on the 
fourth round, which makes it rational for P2 to defect on this round.  But if P1 anticipates this 
 
1
 The Reciprocity Game equilibrium is more compelling in the sense that it is a dominant-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, whereas the Centipede Game equilibrium is not, as we will show later.   
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choice—as it would in a game of complete and perfect information—it would do better to defect 
on the third round, when it would receive 3 rather than 2 that it would receive on the fourth 
round when P1 defects.  This logic carries back to the first round in a finite game, which makes it 
rational for P1 to defect on this round rather than to continue play. 
This is the logic of backward induction, which ends up giving the players (1, 0) when P1 
defects initially, rather than (3, 3) if both players cooperate to the end.  The Centipede Game is 
shown in normal form in Figure 2, wherein P1 chooses c or d on the first and third rounds, and P2 
makes the same choices on the second and fourth rounds.  Each player has four strategies, 
indicated by the Roman numerals in Figure 2, depending on whether it chooses c or d on the two 
rounds when it can make a choice.   
 
Figure 2.  The Centipede Game in Normal Form. 
   P2   
  I. dd II. dc III. cd IV. cc 
 I. dd (1, 0)a (1, 0)b (1, 0) (1, 0) 
P1 II. dc (1, 0)b (1, 0)b (1, 0) 
(
(1, 0) 
 III. cd (0, 2) (0, 2) (3, 1) (3, 1) 
 IV. cc (0, 2) (0, 2) (2, 4) (3, 3) 
Key: a = subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.    b = other Nash-equilibrium outcomes. 
After successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies in this game, only strategies I 
and II of each player remain undominated: First, strategy IV of each player is weakly dominated; 
then strategy III of P2 is weakly dominated; finally, strategy III of P1 is weakly dominated.  
Although no strategy dominates any other for either player, the three outcomes around the 
upper-left outcome of (1,0), indicated by the superscript b, are all Nash equilibria.   
But only the choice of strategy I by both players, which leads to the upper-left outcome and 
is indicated by the superscript a in Figure 2, is subgame perfect for the reason given earlier: 
Working backward from the bottom node in Figure 1 when P2 makes a second choice, each 
player would choose d whenever it has the opportunity to do so, which means that the game 
ends with P1’s initial choice of d.   
By contrast, the three Nash equilibria that are not subgame-perfect involve P1 and P2 
choosing strategy I or strategy II, with at least one of them choosing II.  In effect, P1’s initial 
defection precludes either player from doing better than (1, 0) by switching to a different 
strategy. 
The payoffs of the players in Figure 1 are the smallest natural numbers (1, 2, 3, …) that 
satisfy the following minimality condition for a Centipede Game: A defector does minimally better 
than it would do if the other player defected on the next round.  For example, P1 receives 1 for 
defecting in the first round; if P1 cooperates and P2 then defects in the second round, P1 receives 
0.  Similarly, P2 receives 2 for defecting in the second round; if P2 cooperates and P1 then defects 
in the third round, P2 receives 1.   
We also assume that the defector on the first round, P1, does minimally better than its rival 
at (1, 0), and that both players receive the equal payoffs of (3, 3) if they cooperate to the end.  Of 
course, there are infinitely many Centipede-like Games with larger payoffs that do not satisfy the 
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minimality condition or the aforementioned assumptions, some of which are given in Gaarcia-
Pola, Iriberri, and Kovárík (2016) that is discussed in section 3. 
In summary, the Centipede Game poses a conflict between the self-interest of one player—
the defector on a round—and the mutual interest of both players.  Each player would prefer that 
both cooperate throughout the entire game, except for P2 on the fourth round that triggers earlier 
defections.  But each player’s apprehension that if it cooperates on a round, its rival has an 
incentive to defect on the next round to its detriment interferes with the players’ maximizing 
their equal rewards at the end of play.  We next propose a solution to their dilemma and show 
how it can be implemented.   
3.  The Reciprocity Game 
What happens if the players’ payoffs are interchanged on each round—if P1 receives P2’s 
payoff, and P2 receives P1’s, as shown in the Figure 3 game tree, which defines the Reciprocity 
Game.  Working backward from the bottom node, P2 prefers (3,3) to (4,2) on the fourth round, so 
(3,3) moves up as the outcome that would be chosen on this round.  Then, because  
• P1 prefers (3, 3) to (1, 3) on the third round,  
• P2 prefers (3, 3) to (2, 0) on the second round,  
• P1 prefers (3, 3) to (1, 0) on the first round,  
both players would prefer to continue to cooperate on each round, eventually reaping the 
rewards of (3, 3) on the fourth round.  Like (1, 0) in the Centipede Game, (3, 3) in the Reciprocity 
Game is the unique outcome supported by backward induction and is, therefore, the unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium.   
















(4, 2) (3, 3) 
Unlike the Centipede Game, in which there are four Nash equilibria including one that is 
subgame-perfect, the subgame-perfect equilibrium that results in the (3,3) outcome is the only 
Nash equilibrium in the Reciprocity Game.  Moreover, its implementation requires only that the 
players choose their weakly dominant IV strategies, as shown in the normal form of the game in 
Figure 4.  This renders the (3, 3) outcome of the Reciprocity Game more compelling than the (1, 0) 
outcome of the Centipede Game: Although both are supported by unique subgame-perfect 
equilibria, the former is associated with weakly dominant strategies, whereas the latter competes 




Figure 4.  The Reciprocity Game in Normal Form. 
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   P2   
  I. dd II. dc III. cd IV. cc 
 I. dd (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) 
(
(0, 1) 
P1 II. dc (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) 
 III. cd (2, 0) (2, 0) (1, 3) (1, 3) 
 IV. cc (2, 0) (2, 0) (4, 2) (3, 3)a 
Key: a = subgame-perfect and dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome. 
But how does one get the players to agree to play the Reciprocity Game if the Centipede 
Game is the game with which they start?  Let each player be given the choice—independently 
and at the start of play of the Centipede Game, so neither knows the choice of the other—to 
switch or not switch to the Reciprocity Game.  If either one or both players agree to switch, then 
the Reciprocity Game becomes the game that is played.2  
Experiments with the Centipede Game show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome 
is generally not the choice of subjects (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Nagel and Tang, 1998)).  
Neither are the other Nash-equilibrium outcomes, all of which involve the defection of P1 on the 
first round, terminating future play, so no later rounds are ever reached.    
There are, of course, other Centipede Games besides the one shown in Figure 1; Gaarcia-
Pola, Iriberri, and Kovárík (2016) analyze 16 such games.  Reciprocity works in all of them with 
increasing payoff sums (those in Figure 1 increase by 2 on each successive round) and fails in all 
those with constant or decreasing sums.  In our view, the latter games violate the spirit of a 
Temptation Game in which continuing cooperation brings increasing benefits to the players.  The 
payoff sums are variable in four games, wherein the benefits of cooperation are at best partial 
when payoffs are switched to yield a Reciprocity Game.  
In a standard Centipede Game like that in Figure 1, the unique subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium that gives (1, 0) is not the choice of subjects, including of chess grandmasters, in 
numerous experiments with the Centipede Game.  Like most other players, they cooperate in the 
beginning but, toward the end of play, cooperation breaks down.3  To encourage cooperation 
throughout play, it seems desirable to distribute payoffs so that both players find it in their 
interest not to defect on any round, including the last, which is exactly what the Reciprocity 
Game rationalizes.  Even if the time of occurrence of the last round is uncertain, it is still rational 
 
2
 Requiring only one player rather than both to agree to the switch is “safer” in the following sense: If one 
player. perhaps mistakenly, does not agree, both players still benefit from receiving (3,3) when they choose 
their subgame-perfect dominant strategies in the Reciprocity Game.  The one exception to this statement is 
that P2 can benefit more from (2, 4) than from (3, 3) in the Centipede Game if it defects on the fourth 
round—should that round be reached—but P1 can, by itself, ensure that this does not happen by agreeing to 
play the Reciprocity Game.  As an alternative decision rule, one could require that both P1 and P2 must 
agree to switch to the Reciprocity Game for it to happen, thereby ensuring that there is a consensus for 
switching rather than letting only one player determine this choice.        
3
 This was the finding in Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2011), though an earlier study by Palacio-Huerta and 
Volij (2009) found that chess grandmasters generally chose the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We 
hypothesize that not only chess grandmasters but also other subjects would elect to switch to the 
Reciprocity Game, if given the choice, and cooperate throughout in the latter game.    
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for the players to cooperate until it does, because the dominant subgame-perfect equilibrium of 
cooperation holds for every possible endpoint of a finite game.     
Note that reciprocity in the Reciprocity Game takes the form of rewarding—not 
immediately, but eventually—the player who cooperates on a round instead of the player who 
defects.  On each successive round, each player can reciprocate the cooperation shown to it by the 
rival player, which is always rational for it to do in the Reciprocity Game.  Thereby both players 
cooperate throughout the game and, in the end, equally benefit at (3, 3) in the Reciprocity Game.  
The Reciprocity Game suggests a way in which an arms race, modeled as a Centipede Game, 
may be transformed into an arms-control treaty.  If there is an endpoint, as there often is in a 
treaty, countries may lapse into an arms race before the end because of the temptation to defect, 
as in the Centipede Game.  But the Reciprocity Game reverses this temptation by turning the 
immediate advantage of defection into a reward to the rival player for abiding by the treaty’s 
terms, perhaps by a good will gesture or possibly a threat that would make abrogation of the 
treaty costly.  This seems a sturdier way to undergird trust than to hope, in the Centipede Game, 
that the temptation to defect will not undermine compliance with the treaty.   
The reward for cooperating rather than defecting is what, in international relations, Lebow 
and Stein (1987) refer to as “reassurance.”  This involves countries taking measures that 
discourage a rival from cheating on a treaty or considering a surprise attack.  These measures are 
not just cheap talk, such as pronouncements of good will, but concrete actions to build up trust.  
For example, the countries may develop peaceful means to settle any dispute that may arise. 
This happened between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Cuban missile crisis 
in October 1962.  To be sure, the arms race continued, but the two superpowers established a “hot 
line” in 1963 to enable electronic communication to forestall a future crisis that might escalate to 
nuclear war.  They also agreed to other reciprocal agreements, including a treaty on the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.  Indeed, a period of détente between the 
superpowers, which began in 1969 and lasted until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
was characterized by reciprocal agreements that bore the earmarks of cooperation in the 
Reciprocity Game.     
True, negotiations that lead to a treaty, or concrete measures that offer reassurance to an 
opponent that one intends to do no harm,, may not follow the strict protocol of P1 and P2 making 
alternating choices that yield the payoffs shown in the Reciprocity Game in Figure 3.  
Nonetheless, this game may approximate the players’ give-and-take in negotiating a treaty.  Most 
important, it demonstrates that the redistribution of payoffs in the Centipede Game leads to 
cooperation rather than conflict in the Reciprocity Game.  
4.  Conclusions  
The Reciprocity Game does not provide the only “solution” to the Centipede Game.  Some 
analysts have posited an aversion to the loss of the surplus from cooperation as well as cultural 
and social preferences for fairness or altruism that may overcome distrust.   
Still others have argued, based on some form of forward induction, that past choices can 
serve as a harbinger of future choices and, consequently, for revising one’s beliefs about the 
behavior of a rival.  For example, if P1 at the outset does not defect, this may justify P2’s 
cooperating next, because, by setting an example in choosing c, P1 has provided a reason for 
rejecting the logic of backward induction and hence for P2 also to choose c, especially if the game 
has many rounds.  We know that rarely, if ever, do players follow this logic to the very end by 
always cooperating in the Centipede Game, both in experiments and real life.    
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Axelrod (1984) argued that being “nice” at the outset of an IPD game offers dividends, 
giving several examples of its occurrence.  We do not dispute the advantage of this feature of tit-
for-tat—cooperating at the outset but defecting in response to an opponent’s defection—which 
defeated other strategies in two tournaments and tends to foster the evolution of cooperation in 
IPD.   
The problem is that players, especially toward the end of a repeated game with a definite 
termination point, also see the advantage of defecting near the end—and may well do so.  Not 
surprisingly, if there is no fixed endpoint, cooperation is more likely to persist, but it is not a 
dominant strategy in IPD, as it is in the Reciprocity Game.    
The ability to transform the Centipede Game into the Reciprocity Game—by interchanging 
the payoffs of the players on a round without adding anything to their total value or otherwise 
altering the structure of the game—would not be possible if the Centipede Game were zero-sum.  
Because there is a growing surplus available to the players if the game continues, the players may 
well be induced to cooperate by redistributing it in a way that transforms a “bad” subgame-
perfect equilibrium into a “good” one.4    
The surplus need not come from an outside party.  The players themselves may recognize 
the benefits of continuing cooperation and come to a joint recognition that doing good deeds is a 
better way of settling a dispute, and cementing an agreement, than trying to seize a quick 
advantage that ultimately may backfire.    
The player who makes this choice on each round of the Reciprocity Game boosts the later 
payoffs that both players will ultimately realize.5  It is this reciprocity, rationally based, that locks 
the players into continuing to cooperate in the Reciprocity Game.  
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